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Abstract. The round-robin differential phase shift (RRDPS) quantum key
distribution (QKD) protocol is a unique quantum key distribution protocol whose
security has not been understood through an information-disturbance trade-off
relation, and a sufficient amount of privacy amplification was given independently
of signal disturbance. Here, we discuss the security of the RRDPS protocol in the
asymptotic regime when a good estimate of the bit error rate is available as a measure
of signal disturbance. The uniqueness of the RRDPS protocol shows up as a peculiar
form of information-disturbance trade-off curve. When the length of a block of pulses
used for encoding and the signal disturbance are both small, it provides a significantly
better key rate than that from the original security proof. On the other hand, when
the block length is large, the use of the signal disturbance makes little improvement
in the key rate. Our analysis will bridge a gap between the RRDPS protocol and the
conventional QKD protocols.
Keywords: round-robin differential phase shift quantum key distribution protocol,
quantum key distribution, quantum cryptography
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1. Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8] is an intensively studied field in
quantum information theory because of its practical utility and feasibility. It can provide
an information-theoretic security in which it is assumed that an eavesdropper (Eve) is
only limited by the law of nature, or quantum mechanics. The widely understood idea
about why QKD can guarantee the security is that any attempt to read information
encoded on a quantum state causes a disturbance [9, 10]. If we base the security on
this idea, we have to monitor signal disturbances to detect Eve’s intervention. Recently
a new path to guarantee an information-theoretic security was proposed [11]. This
implementation is called round-robin differential phase shift QKD, or RRDPS-QKD.
The main difference is that it does not need any monitoring of signal disturbance to
ensure the security. Although this approach simplifies the security proof and reduces
overheads caused by the finite-key effect, it is an interesting question whether we can
also understand the RRDPS protocol in the standard way, namely, with the help of
monitoring the disturbance in the transmitted signals. In this paper, we prove the
security of the RRDPS protocol against general attacks with asymptotic key lengths
when it is augmented by a procedure of monitoring the bit error rates. This analysis
will gives us a deeper understanding on how the RRDPS protocol is different from or
similar to the conventional QKD protocols. It also provides a better key rate for small
block sizes and implies the optimality of the original security proof for large block sizes.
2. Protocol
We describe a setup of the RRDPS protocol. The sender Alice prepares an optical pulse
train consisting of L pulses. The optical phase of each pulse is randomly modulated by
0 or pi. We call these L pulses a block and L the block size. Alice applies a common
random phase shift δ to all pulses in the block. The receiver Bob uses the variable-delay
interferometer to measure a relative phase between a randomly chosen pair [12]. A
schematic of this interferometer is illustrated in figure 1. The delay of this interferometer
is randomly chosen from 1 to L− 1 times the interval of the adjacent pulses. Bob uses
photon-number-resolving photon detectors to measure the relative phase of two pulses
in the block. At the same time, Bob makes sure the total number of photons in the
received block is unity, and otherwise declares a failure of detection. The details of this
check process and its variants are given in Appendix A. If the detection has succeeded,
Bob sets his pre-sifted key bit as 0 (1) if the relative phase of the detected pair is 0
(pi). From the timing of the detection and the amount of the chosen delay, Bob can
determine the indices of the detected pair. He discloses the pair of indices over by an
authenticated public channel. Alice sets her pre-sifted key bit by calculating the relative
phase of the announced pair according to her record of the modulations. We refer to
the above procedure involving transmission of one block of pulses as a round. After
repeating a predetermined number (N) of rounds, Alice and Bob announce their pre-
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Figure 1. A schematic of a setup for the RRDPS protocol. Alice sends out a train
of L pulses after randomly applying a phase shift, either 0 or pi to each pulse with
a common random phase offset δ by use of the phase modulator (PM). Bob uses the
variable-delay interferometer to measure a relative phase between a randomly chosen
pair. The amount of the delay is chosen randomly from 1 to L − 1 times the interval
of the adjacent pulses.
sifted key bits of randomly sampled rounds to determine the bit error rate and remove
these key bits from each of the pre-sifted keys to define their sifted keys. We call an
un-sampled round, in which a sifted key bit is produced, as a sifted round. Alice sends
an encrypted syndrome of her sifted key to Bob. Bob reconciles his key to Alice’s key
by use of this syndrome. Then, they perform privacy amplification to obtain a correct
and secure key with small imperfection.
As for the imperfections of the detectors, we assume that a non-unit quantum
efficiency of a detector is modeled by a linear absorber followed by a perfect detector
with unit quantum efficiency. We further assume that the all detectors have the same
quantum efficiency. Then the inefficiency can be modeled by a common linear absorber
placed in front of the interferometer, which can be included in the quantum channel
without compromising the security.
As for Alice’s light source, we assume that the probability that it emits an L-pulse
block containing more photons than a fixed threshold photon number νth is at most esrc.
This condition can be certified in an offline test. In the security proof, we do not assume
that the photon number distribution of the light source is a Poisson distribution.
3. Security
We will prove the security of the RRDPS protocol by use of the Shor-Preskil argument
extended in [13] and the technique in [14]. In this argument, a sufficient amount of the
privacy amplification to guarantee the security of Alice’s key is determined by estimating
how well the results of a complementary measurement can be predicted.
In order to define a complementary measurement for this protocol, we construct an
alternative procedure which is equivalent to the actual setup as follows. In the actual
setup, Alice generates a random bit sequence s1, s2, · · · , sL and emits the corresponding
optical state eiδ
∑
k nˆk
(⊗L
k=1(−1)sknˆk
)
|Ψ〉 , where nˆk is the number operator of the k-th
pulse and |Ψ〉 is the state of the L-pulse train. Since the common phase shift δ is chosen
randomly and is never referred to, we can identify the emitted state as the classical
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mixture of the states projected to the subspaces with fixed total photon number. The
same distribution of the sequence s1, s2, · · · , sL and the corresponding emitted state is
obtained if Alice uses L auxiliary qubits (denoted by (A, 1), · · · , (A,L)) and a classical
register (denoted by c) recording the total photon number to prepare the state
2−L/2
∞∑
ν=0
|ν〉c pˆiν
L⊗
k=1
 ∑
sk∈{0,1}
|sk〉A,k (−1)sknˆk
 |Ψ〉 , (1)
and then measures the auxiliary qubits on the {|0〉A,k , |1〉A,k} bases to determine sk.
Here, pˆiν is the projector onto the state whose number of photons in the block is
ν. We call the {|0〉A,k , |1〉A,k} basis as Z basis of the k-th qubit. We also replace
Alice’s procedure of determining her pre-sifted key bit. In the actual protocol, after
hearing Bob’s announcement of a pair {k, l}, Alice determines her pre-sifted key bit by
computing classical XOR sk⊕sl. An equivalent procedure can be constructed as follows.
Instead of measuring each of the auxiliary qubits on Z basis, we apply a CNOT gate to
the k-th and l-th qubits and then measure the target qubit on the Z basis. Although
the above description of the equivalent procedure is ambiguous about the assignment of
control and target qubits, it will be clarified later.
We define the complementary measurement for this protocol as the X-basis
measurement on the Alice’s target qubit, where X-basis measurement is defined as
{|+〉 , |−〉} basis measurement, and |±〉 is defined as (|0〉 ± |1〉) /√2. We also define the
{|+〉A,k , |−〉A,k} basis as X basis of the k-th qubit. Note that the state |+〉A,k (|−〉A,k)
corresponds to the case where the k-th pulse contains an even (odd) number of photons
(see (B.1)). If no photons are emitted in a block, each auxiliary qubit is left in state
|+〉A,k, and hence the state of the target qubit is always |+〉. This means that the result
of the complementary measurement is predicted with certainty, and it is compatible with
the fact that no information should have leaked on Alice’s sifted key when no photons
were emitted. Based on this observation, we define the occurrence of a “phase error” to
be the case where the complementary measurement results in state |−〉.
The use of a laser as a light source implies that there is no deterministic bound
on the total photon number ν. To handle this, we use the tagging idea [15]. In the
equivalent procedure defined above, (1) implies that Alice can measure the register c
to learn the emitted total photon number ν in each round. We define a round to be
tagged if ν > νth. We pessimistically assume that the full information is leaked for the
tagged rounds. Let δtag be an upper bound on the ratio of the number of tagged and
detected rounds against the total number of detected rounds. Suppose that there is an
upper bound e¯
(ph)
unt (≤ 1/2) on the phase error rate in the untagged and detected rounds,
namely, the number of phase error in the untagged and detected rounds against the total
number of the untagged and detected rounds. According to [13, 15], the asymptotic key
rate per block is then given by
G/N = Q (1− EC− PA) , (2)
EC = fECh(e), (3)
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PA = δtag + (1− δtag)h(e¯(ph)unt ), (4)
where N is the total number of the emitted blocks, Q is the detection rate per block,
EC is the cost for the error correction, PA is the cost for the privacy amplification, h(x)
is the binary entropy function defined as −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x), e is the bit error
rate, and fEC is determined from the efficiency of the bit error correction. Our main
task now is to determine the bound e¯
(ph)
unt under the condition that the observed bit error
rate is e and that the emitted photon number is at most νth.
First, we focus on how the pair {k, l} is determined. Since Bob announces the
pair only when he has received only one photon in a block, the positive-operator
valued measure (POVM) element Pˆ ′{k,l},sBof the actual measurement that determines
the unordered pair {k, l} and the bit sB corresponding to the phase difference is written
as
Pˆ ′{k,l},sB =
1
2(L− 1) Pˆ
(
1√
2
(|k〉B + (−1)sB |l〉B)
)
, (5)
where Pˆ (|ψ〉) is defined as |ψ〉 〈ψ|, and |k〉 refers to the state of the L pulses containing
one photon in the k-th pulse and no other photons. Note that the success of detection
corresponds to the operator∑
{k,l}∈P,sB∈{0,1}
Pˆ ′{k,l},sB =
1
2
∑
k∈{1,···,L}
Pˆ (|k〉B) , (6)
where we define P as {{k, l} | k < l, k, l,∈ {1, · · · , L}}. This equation means that as
long as the received block contains one photon in total, Bob’s detection succeeds with
probability 1/2 regardless of its state. We can thus rewrite the actual measurement
equivalently to the three-step measurement procedure defined as
(i) Bob confirms that there is one photon in the received block via an ideal projection
(quantum non-demolition) measurement. If not, the measurement procedure ends
with a failure of detection.
(ii) With a probability of 1/2, Bob ends the measurement procedure with a failure of
detection.
(iii) Reaching this step implies that the success of detection has been assured. Bob
performs the measurement defined by Pˆ{k,l},sB(:= 2Pˆ
′
{k,l},sB) on the L pulses to
determine an outcome ({k, l}, sB). He announces the unordered pair {k, l}.
In order to assess the security of Alice’s final key, we introduce a virtual protocol
in which Bob decides, prior to the step (iii), whether the round is to be sampled or
not. Further, when it is not to be sampled, he forgoes the step (iii) of the three-
step measurement procedure and instead announces an ordered pair (k, l)(k 6= l) via a
measurement described by the POVM elements
Pˆ(k,l) =
1
(L− 1) Pˆ (|k〉B) . (7)
This measurement is understood as it determines the index k of the pulse containing
the single photon and randomly chooses the other index l. From the viewpoint of
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determining the unordered pair {k, l}, this virtual measurement is equivalent to the
actual measurement because
Pˆ(k,l) + Pˆ(l,k) = Pˆ{k,l},0 + Pˆ{k,l},1. (8)
This means that any attack strategy by Eve can be applied to the virtual protocol and
leads to the same final state over Alice’s final key and Eve’s quantum system as in the
actual protocol. Therefore, the security of the virtual protocol implies that of the actual
one. Now we remove the ambiguity about the assignment of control and target qubits
for the CNOT gate. We choose the index of the control qubit to be k when the ordered
pair (k, l) was announced. We can then write the POVM element eˆ
(ph)
(k,l) corresponding
to the announcement of (k, l) and occurrence of a phase error (finding the target qubit
in state |−〉) as
eˆ
(ph)
(k,l) = Pˆ (|−〉A,l)Pˆ(k,l), (9)
where we have used invariance of P (|−〉A,l) under the CNOT gate. We also define the
POVM element eˆ(ph) corresponding to the occurrence of a phase error as
eˆ(ph) =
∑
{k,l}∈P
eˆ
(ph)
(k,l) + eˆ
(ph)
(l,k). (10)
In order to bound the phase error rate e
(ph)
unt in the untagged sifted rounds in
the virtual protocol, we utilize the bit error rate in the sample, which is determined
commonly in the actual and the virtual protocol. We also use the condition on the
total photon number in an untagged round. In accordance with the definition of eˆph, we
regard the occurrence of a bit error as an outcome of a joint measurement on Alice’s L
qubits and Bob’s L pulses prior to the step (iii). The corresponding POVM element eˆ
is given by
eˆ =
∑
{k,l}∈P,s,sB∈{0,1}
Pˆ
(
|s〉A,k |s⊕ sB ⊕ 1〉A,l
)
Pˆ{k,l},sB (11)
As for the total photon number, (1) dictates that the state of Alice’s L qubits is confined
in a subspaceHA,ν when the emitted total photon number is ν. Let Pˆ (ν) be the projector
toHA,ν . An asymptotic relation between the phase error rate e(ph)unt in the untagged sifted
rounds and the bit error rate eunt in the untagged sampled rounds is then derived by
considering the maximum eigenvalue Ω(ν, λ) of the operator Pˆ (ν)(eˆ(ph) − λeˆ)Pˆ (ν) for
ν ≤ νth and a positive number λ. The detailed calculation given in Appendix B leads
to the following. In the asymptotic limit, we have
e
(ph)
unt ≤ F (νth, eunt) , (12)
where F (ν, e) is defined as
F (ν, e) := inf
λ≥0
(λe+ Ω(ν, λ)) , (13)
Ω(ν, λ) := max (Ω−(ν, λ),Ω+(ν, λ)) , (14)
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(a) (b)
Figure 2. The graph of the function F (ν, e), which also implicitly depends on the
block size L. (a) For L = 6, we vary ν from 1 to 3. (b) For L = 64, we vary ν from 1
to 32. The value of F (ν, e) increases as ν becomes larger.
Ω−(ν, λ) :=
ν − 1
L− 1 −
Lλ+ 2
4(L− 1)
(
1−
√
1− 8(ν − 1)λ
(Lλ+ 2)2
)
, (15)
and
Ω+(ν, λ) :=
ν
L− 1 − λ
L− 1− ν
2(L− 1) . (16)
We illustrate the function F (ν, e) for the cases L = 6 and L = 64 in figure 2. As
is seen from the figure, each curve for F (ν, e) with fixed ν can be well approximated by
two straight segments, given by
F (ν, e) ∼

ν − 1
L
(
1− e
e∗(ν)
)
+
ν
L− 1
e
e∗(ν)
0 ≤ e < e∗(ν)
ν
L− 1 e ≥ e
∗(ν)
(17)
where e∗(ν) is defined as (L− 1− ν)/(2(L− 1)). The function F (ν, e) takes a constant
value when e is large. The value of ν/(L − 1) reproduces the result of the original
security proof [11]. There, the bound was derived by an argument which relies neither
on the state of the pulses after Eve’s intervention nor correlations between Alice’s and
Bob’s systems. Roughly speaking, Eve cannot learn most of the phases of the L pulses
emitted from Alice since those pulses are weak. Moreover, as seen in (7), one of the
announced indices is uniformly random no matter what state Eve sends to Bob. These
two properties prevent Eve from predicting the phase difference in the announced pair.
When e is small, the bound F (ν, e) becomes lower as e becomes smaller, which is a
typical information-disturbance trade-off. Qualitatively, the origin of the trade-off is
the same as the original DPS protocol [7]. If Eve reads the relative phase between
two successive weak pulses, she disturbs the relative phases of these pulses to the other
pulses, increasing the bit error rate. More quantitatively, however, it was also shown
[16, 14] that Eve can considerably suppress the increase in the bit error rate by gradually
modulating the amplitudes of a sequence of pulses in the DPS protocol. Since the relative
RRDPS based on signal disturbance 8
(a) (b)
Figure 3. Asymptotic key rate per pulse G/(LN) versus overall transmission η for
(a) L = 6 and (b) L = 64. We assume a constant bit error rate of 3%. The upper
curve: the key rate when the signal disturbance is monitored. The lower curve: the
key rate when the signal disturbance is not monitored.
phases of two distant pulses in this strategy are highly disturbed, it causes a high bit
error rate in the RRDPS protocol.
The remaining problem is to bound δtag and eunt. From the definition of esrc, the
expected total number of the tagged rounds is at most Nesrc. If we recall Bob’s three-
step measurement procedure, we see that half of the rounds lead to detection failure at
step (ii). In the asymptotic limit, it means
δtag ≤ esrc
2Q
. (18)
As for eunt, we use the fact that a fraction (1 − δtag) of the sampled rounds should be
untagged in the asymptotic limit. Then, we have eunt(1− δtag) ≤ e, namely,
eunt ≤ e
1− δtag . (19)
Combining these bounds with (4), we obtain a sufficient amount of the privacy
amplification as
PA =
esrc
2Q
+
(
1− esrc
2Q
)
h
(
F
(
νth,
e
1− esrc
2Q
))
. (20)
4. Secure key rate
In order to examine how the performance of the RRDPS protocol is improved by use
of the bit error rate, we calculate the secure key generation rate based on the following
model. We assume that the dark countings are negligible and set e = 0.03 and fEC = 1.1.
We also assume that the measurement results are the same as those calculated with the
source emitting coherent states. It means that Q and esrc is written as
Q =
Lµη
2
exp
(
−Lµη
2
)
(21)
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and
esrc = 1− exp(−Lµ)
νth∑
ν=0
(Lµ)ν
ν!
, (22)
where µ is the average photon number of a pulse and η is the overall transmission rate. In
figure 3, we plot the key rate per pulse G/(LN) as a function of the overall transmission
rate η for L = 6 and L = 64. We optimized the values of νth and µ for each η. We also
plotted the key rate when the amount of privacy amplification is independent of the bit
error rate, which is given by (20) with F (ν, e) replaced by νth/(L − 1). These graphs
confirm that we can improve the key rate by use of signal disturbance. On the other
hand, the amount of improvement decreases as the block size becomes larger. This
behavior can be ascribed to the gap between F (ν, 0) and F (ν, 0.5), namely, how the
ability of Eve to cause a phase error depends on whether her attack is restricted to a
low bit error rate or not. In the limit of no bit errors, what Eve can do is to leave one of
the ν emitted photons untouched and pass on to Bob. She gathers information from the
remaining ν−1 photons, while she has no control over which indices will be announce by
Bob because the photon passed on to Bob is coherent over entire pulses and hence there
is no correlation to the other systems. This explains the value of F (ν, 0) = (ν − 1)/L.
When we remove the restriction on the bit error, Eve can use all of the ν photons to
gather information. She can also have a partial influence on the announced indices. As
seen from (7), she has the power of veto on one value and the range of index l spans
L− 1 values. This results in F (ν, 0.5) = ν/(L− 1). When the block size becomes large,
both values behaves as ν/L, leading to a small difference in Eve’s ability.
5. Summary
In this paper, we proved the security of the RRDPS protocol against general attacks in
the asymptotic regime from the standard viewpoint that Eve’s intervention is estimated
from the signal disturbance. The key ingredient of the security proof was to determine
the relation between the bit error rate and the phase error rate, where the latter
represents the lack of ability to predict an observable complementary to the sifted key.
As in the other protocols such as the BB84 protocol, the phase error rate decreases as
the signal disturbance approaches to zero. On the other hand, beyond a threshold value
of the bit error rate, the phase error ceases to depend on the bit error rate, which gives
an alternative explanation for the original RRDPS protocol in terms of information-
disturbance relation. We have seen an improvement in the key rate compared to that
obtained with no monitoring of the signal disturbance. The difference is prominent for a
small value of the block size L, whereas it decreases with L. The reason for this behavior
is that the leading O(L−1) term of the phase error rate is the same regardless of whether
the bit error is restricted or not. This indicates that the original RRDPS protocol for a
large block size is almost optimal even though it does not use the information available
from monitoring disturbance.
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Figure A1. (a): A setup for counting the total photon number deterministically.
An optical shutter is placed just before the variable-delay interferometer. It is closed
during the arrival timings of the idle pulses. (b): A measurement setup using threshold
detectors. An optical shutter is placed just before the variable delay. When the shutter
is closed for the whole block, the double count rate of this setup can bound the rate of
rounds where there are two or more photons in the block received by Bob. The optical
shutter is also used for avoiding the mixing with the next block.
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Appendix A.
In order to count the total photon number by using the photon number resolving
detectors after the delayed interferometer, we need a careful implementation to avoid
crosstalk between adjacent blocks. One simple way is to define blocks such that each
block is followed by L − 1 idle pulses before the next block starts. As in figure A1(a),
Bob places an optical shutter in front of his apparatus and close it during the arrival
timings of the idle pulses. All photons in a block are then reach a detector at one of
2L−1 timings dedicated solely for the block. In this scheme, the insertion of idle pulses
almost halves the efficiency of the protocol. In order to avoid the separation of blocks,
Bob can prepare two copies of variable interferometers and use a switch to redirect every
other incoming block to each interferometer.
There is another way to handle this problem, which allows the use of threshold
detectors (distinguishing only the vacuum from one or more photons) instead of the
photon number resolving detectors, which was adopted in the demonstration [17] of the
RRDPS protocol with a passive configuration. Instead of actually learning the photon
number in each block, we use the idea of tagging, namely, the property that each multi-
photon block can be tagged in principle without affecting the measurements in the
protocol. To obtain an upper bound on the number of tagged rounds, Bob places an
optical shutter just before the variable delay as in figure A1(b). For a randomly sampled
block, he throws away all the pulses in the delayed arm, and records the occurrence of
coincidence detections in the entire block. This is equivalent to a conventional setup
[18, 19], which can be used for bounding the probability of multiple photons in the
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signal. In this scheme, it is not necessary to separate the blocks apart because the
optical shutter can be used for avoiding the mixing with the next block by throwing
away the pulses that are to be delayed beyond the block duration.
Appendix B.
We first identify the subspace HA,ν of Alice’s L qubits and the corresponding projection
Pˆ (ν). The initial state in (1) can be rewritten in terms of the X basis of the qubits as
∞∑
ν=0
|ν〉c pˆiν
L⊗
k=1
 ∑
±s∈{+,−}
|±s〉A,k
1
2
(
1±s (−1)nˆk
) |Ψ〉 . (B.1)
The operator 1
2
(
1±s (−1)nˆk
)
is a projection onto the subspace in which the k-th pulse
includes even (or odd) number of photons. Let us write the X-basis states of Alice’s L
qubits as Hˆ⊗L |a〉A, where a is the array of bit values ak, |a〉A represents
⊗L
k=1 |ak〉A,k,
and Hˆ is the Hadamard operator. Let |a| be∑Lk=1 δak,1. The correlation in (B.1) implies
that when the qubits are found in state Hˆ⊗L |a〉A, the total emitted photon number ν
satisfies ν ≥ |a| and has the same parity as that of |a|. Hence, given ν, the state of the
qubits should be contained in subspace HA,ν defined by the projection
Pˆ (ν) :=
∑
|a|∈Nν
Pˆ
(
Hˆ⊗L |a〉A
)
, (B.2)
with Nν := {ν − 2k | k ∈ Z, k ≥ 0, ν − 2k ≥ 0}.
For a non-negative number λ, let us define Ω(ν, λ) as the largest eigenvalue of the
operator Pˆ (ν)
(
eˆ(ph) − λeˆ) Pˆ (ν), which satisfies
Pˆ (ν)
(
eˆ(ph) − λeˆ) Pˆ (ν) ≤ Ω(ν, λ)Pˆ (ν). (B.3)
Let us consider one of the untagged rounds, which means ν ≤ νth, and let ρˆunt be the
state of Alice’s L qubits and Bob’s L pulses prior to the step (iii). From its construction,
ρˆunt satisfies Pˆ
(ν)ρˆuntPˆ
(ν) = ρˆunt. By multiplying (B.3) by ρˆν and taking the trace, we
find
Tr
(
ρˆunteˆ
(ph)
) ≤ λTr(ρˆunteˆ) + max
ν≤νth
Ω(ν, λ). (B.4)
This inequality implies that for any (> 0), the probability of violating the inequality
e
(ph)
unt ≤ λeunt + max
ν≤νth
Ω(ν, λ) +  (B.5)
for the measured values decreases exponentially as the number of the untagged and
detected rounds becomes larger. One way to prove this statement is to define a sequence
regarded as a martingale and use Azuma’s inequality [20].
Next, we determine the function Ω(ν, λ). We introduce a unitary operator Uˆ by
the relation
UˆHˆ⊗L |a〉A |k〉B = Hˆ⊗L |a′〉A |k〉B , (B.6)
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where a′ is defined by a′l = al ⊕ δl,k for each element. In terms of this unitary, the
operators Pˆ (ν), eˆ, and eˆ(ph) are transformed as
Uˆ †Pˆ (ν)Uˆ =
∑
|a|=ν−1,ν−3,···
Pˆ
(
Hˆ⊗L |a〉A
)
+
∑
|a|=ν+1
L∑
k=1
Pˆ
(
Hˆ⊗L |a〉A
)
Pˆ (|k〉B) δak,1, (B.7)
Uˆ †eˆUˆ =
∑
{k,l}∈P
1
L− 1 Pˆ
(
1√
2
(|k〉B − |l〉B)
)
, (B.8)
Uˆ †eˆ(ph)Uˆ = eˆ(ph)
=
1
L− 1
∑
a∈Q
Pˆ
(
Hˆ⊗L |a〉A
) L∑
k=1
Pˆ (|k〉B) ((|a| − 1)δak,1 + |a|δak,0) , (B.9)
where Q is defined as {0, 1}L.
Since all the transformed operators commute with Pˆ
(
Hˆ⊗L |a〉A
)
, we have a direct-
sum decomposition
Uˆ †Pˆ (ν)
(
eˆ(ph) − λeˆ) Pˆ (ν)Uˆ = ∑
|a|=ν+1,ν−1,ν−3,···
Pˆ
(
Hˆ⊗L |a〉A
)
⊗ Λˆ(ν, λ, a). (B.10)
Due to the symmetry over the permutation of the index, the largest eigenvalue of
Λˆ(ν, λ, a) depends only on |a|, which we denote by Ω(ν, λ, |a|). Equation (B.10) implies
that Ω(ν, λ) is equal to the maximum of Ω(ν, λ, |a|) over |a| = ν + 1, ν − 1, ν − 3, · · ·.
For evaluation of Ω(ν, λ, |a|), it suffices to consider sequences in the from of
a = (1, · · · , 1, 0, · · · , 0). The matrix representation of operator Λˆ(ν, λ, a) is conveniently
described by the following matrices. Define d-dimensional matrices M
(d)
1 and M
(d,m)
2 by
∀i, j, (M (d)1 )ij = 1 (B.11)
and
∀i, j, (M (d,m)2 )ij =
{
1 i = j ≤ m
0 otherwise
. (B.12)
We also define 1(d) as the identity matrix. From (B.7), (B.8), and (B.9), the nonzero
part of Λˆ(ν, λ, a) is represented as
λ
2(L− 1)M
(L)
1 −
1
L− 1M
(L,|a|)
2 +
2|a| − Lλ
2(L− 1) 1
(L) (B.13)
for |a| = ν − 1, ν − 3, · · ·, and
λ
2(L− 1)M
(|a|)
1 +
2(|a| − 1)− λL
2(L− 1) 1
(|a|) (B.14)
for |a| = ν + 1. In order to obtain their eigenvalues, we use the next proposition.
Proposition 1.
det
(
αM
(d)
1 + βM
(d,m)
2 + γ1
(d)
)
= γd−m−1(γ + β)m−1(γ2 + (β + dα)γ + (d−m)αβ) (B.15)
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(Proof of proposition 1) The normalized vectors defined as
m−1/2(1, e
2piik
m , · · · , e 2piik(m−1)m , 0, · · · , 0) (k = 1, · · · ,m− 1) (B.16)
and the normalized vectors defined as
(d−m)−1/2(0, · · · , 0, 1, e 2piikd−m , · · · , e 2piik(d−m−1)d−m ) (k = 1, · · · , d−m− 1) (B.17)
are the eigenvectors with the eigenvalues β + γ and γ. The remaining space is spanned
by the two normalized vectors m−1/2(1, . . . 1, 0, . . . , 0) and (d−m)−1/2(0, . . . 0, 1, . . . , 1).
By directly calculating the determinant, we obtain (B.15).
By use of proposition 1, we obtain the largest eigenvalues of (B.13) and (B.14) as
Ω−(ν, λ) := max|a|=ν−1,ν−3,···
Ω(ν, λ, |a|) = Ω(ν, λ, ν − 1)
=
ν − 1
L− 1 −
Lλ+ 2
4(L− 1)
(
1−
√
1− 8(ν − 1)λ
(Lλ+ 2)2
)
(B.18)
and
Ω+(ν, λ) := Ω(ν, λ, ν + 1) =
ν
L− 1 − λ
L− 1− ν
2(L− 1) , (B.19)
respectively. Thus, the function Ω(ν, λ) is given by
Ω(ν, λ) = max (Ω−(ν, λ),Ω+(ν, λ)) . (B.20)
From the explicit expressions of Ω(ν, λ), we find that Ω(ν, λ) is an increasing
function for ν. It means
max
ν≤νth
Ω(ν, λ) = Ω(νth, λ). (B.21)
Combined with (13), it ensures that for any  > 0, there exists λ ≥ 0 such that
λeunt + max
ν≤νth
Ω(ν, λ) ≤ F (νth, eunt) + . (B.22)
With (B.5), we see that the probability of violating
e
(ph)
unt ≤ F (νth, eunt) + 2 (B.23)
vanishes in the asymptotic limit. This statement is the precise meaning of (12).
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